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Kingmakers or Cheerleaders?
Party Power and the Causal Effects of
Endorsements
Abstract: When parties make endorsements in primary 
elections, does the favored candidate receive a real boost 
in her vote share, or do parties simply pick the favorites 
who are already destined to win? To answer this question, 
we draw on two research designs aimed at isolating the 
causal effect of Democratic Party endorsements in 
California’s 2012 primary election.  First, we conduct a 
survey experiment in which we randomly assign a party 
endorsement, holding all other aspects of a candidate’s 
background and policy positions constant.  Second, we use 
a unique dataset to implement a regression-discontinuity 
analysis of electoral trends by comparing the vote shares 
captured by candidates who barely won or barely lost the 
internal party endorsement contest.  We find a 
constellation of evidence suggesting that endorsements do
indeed matter, though this effect appears to be contingent 
upon the type of candidate and voter: endorsements 
matter most for candidates in their party’s mainstream, 
and for voters who identify with that party.  The magnitude
of their impact is smaller than might be estimated from 
research designs less attuned to recent advances in causal
inference.     
    
Endorsements are a key tool allowing party elites to exert control
over the selection of nominees. While American party leaders could 
once directly pick nominees through secretive caucuses or tightly 
managed conventions, their power to determine party nominations in 
the age of the direct primary is negligible unless they have a way to 
actually influence primary voters. Partisan endorsements, by which 
partisan elites communicate their preferences directly to donors, 
political activists, the media, and voters in general, are a central 
means by which this influence occurs. Parties do play other roles -- by 
recruiting or discouraging candidates, and by shepherding wealthy 
donors or energetic volunteers towards their favored candidates -- but 
a formal endorsement remains the strongest signal that a party can 
send. These endorsements must exert a real impact on candidates’ 
electoral fortunes if parties are to be kingmakers in American politics.
The influence of prominent endorsements is often taken for 
granted by political observers, but just how much power do such 
messages have? If their power over voters is weak, then our political 
system is essentially a candidate-centered one. The candidate's own 
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skills and appeals would be determinative of both capturing the 
endorsement and winning the primary, with party leaders essentially 
relegated to the role of cheerleaders, rooting on strong candidates. On 
the other hand, if endorsements are highly influential over voters, then
party leaders may assume some (if not all) of the authority they once 
had in the age of the party machines, determining which candidates 
bear the party mantel and which do not.
In this paper, we take advantage of two unique datasets to offer 
robust tests of the power of endorsements in party contests.  
Specifically, we look at the responses by California's Democratic Party 
to Proposition 14, the 2010 initiative that created a top-two open 
primary system in that state. The top-two system essentially deprived 
parties of the power of nominations, placing voters of both parties -- or 
of no party at all -- in charge of picking candidates in the June primary. 
Both major parties, seeking to focus their supporters on a single 
candidate who would advance to the top-two runoff, responded by 
creating a robust system of party endorsements. We obtained access 
to the internal votes by activists that determined the Democratic 
endorsements, allowing us to see which candidates just barely won or 
lost the endorsement. We supplement our analysis of endorsements 
and 2012 election returns with an original survey experiment put in the
field during that contest. While the opportunities to study 
endorsements in this single election are unique, there is no reason to 
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believe that the impact of endorsements on voter behavior in it will be 
idiosyncratic. Importantly, even though the change in the primary 
system increased the incentives of strategic party organizations to 
make endorsements, it did not notably change the reasons why voters 
might rely on parties to guide them through the process.  
We look at the influence of these endorsements in two ways. 
First, we conduct a survey of 1,000 Californians and present them with 
a hypothetical ballot for a state Assembly race, randomizing the 
Democratic Party's endorsement between two Democratic contenders. 
Second, we perform a regression discontinuity analysis of the results of
the 2012 June primary election, using the results of internal party 
endorsement votes to control for partisan support for the candidates. 
Both approaches yield similar estimates of the magnitude of a party 
endorsement -- roughly 10 percentage points of the vote -- although 
this effect varies considerably based on the attributes of the candidate 
and of voters.  In sum, we draw on a constellation of evidence to 
address an effect that prior studies have found to be quite large and, 
when we apply methods aimed at pinpointing causal inference, find 
that it is modest in substance and just over the threshold of statistical 
significance, suggesting that parties exert an important but limited 
influence on the selection of candidates.  
3
I. Prior Research Measuring the Impact of 
Endorsements
Our research focuses specifically on the effect of party 
endorsements, but follows in the tradition of a larger literature on 
endorsements by many types of political organizations. The main 
research challenge in such studies is that those who endorse 
candidates – whether media outlets, celebrities, party elites, or official 
party organizations – often pick candidates who have a high likelihood 
of winning in the first place.  This makes the endorsement endogenous 
to the candidate’s electoral appeal.  Partially, this is a result of 
endorsers simply being strategic; there is little value in backing a loser,
whereas a winner who perceives a benefit from the endorsement can 
express her gratitude in tangible ways once in office. This is also due to
the fact that the same qualities that make a candidate appealing to 
endorsers also make her appealing to voters and donors. An endorsed 
candidate may do better than her rivals, but it is difficult to know 
whether that vote share difference was caused by the endorsement or 
whether both were caused by factors related to candidate quality.
Early studies of the power of newspaper endorsements in 
elections tended to ignore measures of candidate quality or campaign 
spending, but still found important trends suggesting that those 
candidates with endorsements did better than those without them
(Gregg 1965, Hooper 1969, McClenghan 1973, Erikson 1976). Why 
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might endorsements actually move votes? Quite simply, they provide 
information that voters lack, helping them learn about candidates and 
make a complex decision with relatively modest effort (Nisbett and 
Ross 1980, Kahneman et al. 1982, Lupia 1994, Druckman 2001). Such 
cues are imperfect, of course – novice voters can be led astray from 
their preferences by endorsements, particularly when voting decisions 
are complex (Lau and Redlawsk 2001) – but they are still highly useful. 
This information is particularly helpful in environments in which party 
labels are not available, such as primary elections or many local 
contests (Stein and Fleischmann 1987). In general elections, 
conversely, endorsements may have little effect, particularly in periods
or on issues on which the electorate is already deeply divided (Gimpel 
1998). That said, Ladd and Lenz (2009) find substantial conversion 
effects from newspaper endorsements in the 1997 British 
parliamentary elections, suggesting that endorsements can matter 
even in high-profile contests where the partisan consequences are 
clear and the party structure has been stable for several generations.  
McDermott (2006) and Arceneaux and Kolodny (2009) have shown the 
interest group endorsements can also matter, serving as either 
positive (for friends of the group) or negatives (for its foes) cues.  
Several studies focus specifically on primary elections, under the 
assumption that endorsements – particularly by party elites – are more
critical to such contests’ outcomes. These studies are of central 
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importance to the understanding of political parties. Party elites, after 
all, cannot directly pick candidates to represent their parties. Since the
advent of the direct primary more than a century ago, party leaders 
have sought to choose their nominees by communicating with loyal 
party voters in primary contests. They do this largely through the use 
of endorsements, but also through the strategic allocation of funding 
and campaign expertise (Cohen et al. 2008, Masket 2009, Bawn et al. 
2012).
Studies of elite control over parties tend to assume that 
endorsements have some effect on primary voters, and several have 
found such effects. Dominguez (2011), for example, provides a 
detailed analysis of congressional primaries, finding that partisan 
endorsements can increase a candidate’s vote share, even controlling 
for funding and candidate quality. She determines that a five percent 
increase in the share of partisan endorsements is associated with a 
one-point increase in the primary vote share. Steger’s (2007) study of 
endorsements in presidential nomination contests finds that a 
candidate’s share of party endorsements made prior to the Iowa 
caucuses positively predicts her vote share in subsequent presidential 
primaries, even controlling for the candidate’s spending, position in the
polls, and quality.  Cohen et al.’s (2008) analysis echoes Steger’s; a 
candidate’s share of key endorsements prior to Iowa does a better job 
predicting primary performance than polling, fundraising, or media 
6
coverage.  And Stone, Rapoport, and Abramowitz (1992) estimate that 
the AFL-CIO’s backing of Walter Mondale was worth an additional six 
percentage points of the vote in the 1984 Iowa Democratic caucus.
The central concern to estimating the impact of an endorsement,
however, is endogeneity. Masket (2009), for example, found that elite 
endorsements correlated with higher vote shares for candidates in 
local primary elections in California after controlling for candidate 
quality and spending. However, candidates with electoral appeal and 
good early fundraising totals were better positioned to capture these 
endorsements, making it unclear whether the endorsers were acting as
kingmakers or simply rallying behind the strongest candidate.  It is 
difficult to control for candidate quality, because no comprehensive 
measure of everything that confers electoral strength is available. Most
researchers tend to follow Jacobson and Kernell’s (1981) approach of 
treating those who have previously held elective office as high quality 
and those without such experience as low quality. This approach can 
be effective, but it is unlikely that any single variable alone can 
capture all the ways in which candidate quality varies, many of them 
ineffable and elusive to quantitative measurement.
II. California's Adaptation to the Top-Two Primary
Our research design uses two approaches to break the 
endogenous relationship between a candidate’s underlying electoral 
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strength and whether she wins the endorsement.  Both leverage 
unique data sources from California’s new top-two primary.
California’s legislature is now one of the most polarized 
legislatures in the country (Masket 2009, Shor and McCarty 2011).  As 
a result, many political observers, reformers, and officeholders have 
converged on the goal of mitigating party polarization in the state’s 
politics.  Toward this end, reformers have pushed two specific reforms 
over the past few years – redistricting reform (placing a bipartisan 
panel of citizens, rather than the state legislature, in charge of 
redrawing legislative districts) and the top-two primary.  It is this 
second reform that motivates our analysis.
The top-two primary -- employed only by Louisiana, Washington, 
and now California -- is perhaps the most “open” form of primary rules.
Not only can all voters participate, but they may choose among all 
candidates for office, not just those within one party.  This reform was 
widely seen as threatening to the establishment of both of the state's 
major political parties. After all, it essentially placed party nominations 
in the hands of voters not registered with the party, and as the U.S. 
Supreme Court remarked in 2000, "a single election in which the party 
nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy 
the party" (California Democratic Party V. Jones  2000). The language 
of Proposition 14 specifically redefined the June contest as a "voter-
nomination primary election" rather than a party contest, reflecting the
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fact that this election was no longer one in which a party could 
determine its nominee.
The major parties moved quickly to respond to this shift in the 
laws by capitalizing on their party endorsement system, enabling them
to reassert some control over party nominations and converge voter 
support around candidates more faithful to the party banners. 
Endorsements would be considered and voted on at party county and 
state central committee meetings. The state Republican party actually 
moved first on this front (Van Oot 2011), but the Democratic party 
soon followed suit.  Under the new Democratic rules, any candidate 
may be considered endorsed with a 70 percent vote at a county 
central committee meeting, or at the state central committee meeting 
with a 50 percent vote for incumbents or a 60 percent vote for 
challengers.1 The list of endorsees would then appear within the official
ballot pamphlet mailed by the Secretary of State to voters prior to the 
election. Notably, indications of endorsements did not appear on the 
sample ballot pages, but rather in a later page of the pamphlet where 
they were much less visible. (No endorsements appeared on the ballot 
itself, making the information available to voters in this election similar
to what is generally available to voters in contests in other years and in
other states.)  Candidates winning the endorsement would also be free
to trumpet it far and wide in their campaign communications.  
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To be sure, the 2012 primary was an unusual one for candidates,
party elites, and unusually attentive voters, who were navigating a 
form of election that was rare for the nation and entirely new for the 
state. But for the lay voter, it was mostly business as usual. The 
primary was held in June, as it typically is in California, and was 
conducted with much the same fanfare. Voter turnout was on the low 
end of normal. Candidate information, including party endorsements, 
were available in state election literature for those voters who sought it
-- just as similar information was in previous primary elections -- and 
voters still had to choose among a range of candidates for each office. 
Just how much influence did these endorsements have?  In our 
theory section, we lay out the potential paths through which they 
might affect candidate vote shares.  In the following sections, we 
describe the results of two efforts to determine the power of the party 
endorsements.  The first method is through the use of a survey in 
which we proposed two fictitious Democratic candidates for an 
Assembly seat and randomized the party's endorsement. The second 
method is through a regression discontinuity analysis of the actual 
election results of the June 2012 primary election.  Each of these 
approaches to causal inference breaks the endogeneity that plagues a 
simple comparison of the performance of candidates winning and 
losing endorsement battles.  In our survey experiment, we randomly 
assign the endorsement, holding the candidates’ other attributes 
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constant.  Our regression discontinuity compares the vote shares of 
candidates who just barely won and narrowly lost an endorsement, but
who are otherwise quite similar in their electoral strength.  We focus 
our analysis in both sections on competing Democratic candidates, 
because Democrats are the dominant party in California2 and the one 
for which we have obtained internal records of endorsement votes. 3    
III. Theory: Why Should Endorsements Matter? 
Before grounding our empirical expectations in prior work on 
political behavior, we note that our survey experiment and our 
regression-discontinuity design will teach slightly different lessons.  
The survey will show whether endorsements can help candidates by 
doing nothing more than sending a signal to voters.  We 
experimentally manipulate this signal and look for its impact, holding 
all else equal.  By contrast, our regression-discontinuity design, drawn 
from observational evidence about whether an endorsement given in 
early 2012 benefitted candidates in June of that year, gauges the total 
effect of endorsements through their signal to voters, donors, and 
other potential endorsers.  Endorsed candidates may win higher vote 
shares because party’s imprimatur helps to coordinate potential 
donors in an area or because it leads to a crescendo of other 
endorsements from interest groups and local political leaders.  
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An endorsement can benefit candidates in June through these 
causal paths even if voters pay no attention to the party’s signal itself. 
If our regression discontinuity shows that candidates who just barely 
win the party endorsement see a jump in their vote share, this could 
be because of voter signaling effects alone, broader campaign effects 
alone, or some combination of the two.  By contrast, our survey 
experiment isolates the impact of the signal that an endorsement 
sends to voters.  In the remainder of this section, we specify exactly 
how we expect that signal to influence voters.    
First, we expect that when a candidate receives the party 
endorsement in our survey, the candidate should receive a higher level
of support from respondents than when that candidate is not given the 
endorsement.  This is a straightforward hypothesis that works directly 
through voter information, though of course the information that an 
endorsement provides for voters could lead to higher vote shares 
through multiple avenues.  It could give voters a cue that experts who 
share their interests know that this candidate will best represent them
(Lupia and McCubbins 1998, Boudreau 2009). It could tell them that 
they will be following other voters.  Learning about an endorsement 
might inform voters that a candidate will be the focal point for their co-
partisans, leading them to follow along with the group’s coordination.  
Finally, it could tell them that they will be voting with elites.  McClosky,
Zaller, and Chong (1985) show that receiving and comprehending the 
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elite viewpoint may push voters to internalize the norm as their own, 
with voters in the 2012 primary acting in much the same way as the 
voters who adopted elite positions on an anti-gay California proposition
in the 1980s.  
Hypothesis 1. Endorsements should benefit candidates.  In 
our survey experiment, a respondent will be more likely to 
support a candidate who (by random assignment) has won 
the endorsement, while in our observational data, 
candidates who barely win the endorsement should earn a 
higher primary vote share than those who barely lose it.   
Second, we ask which voters should respond to the signal of an 
endorsement.  For strong Democrats, an endorsement by the 
Democratic Party should have a strong effect, while for Republican 
voters it should help not at all (or perhaps even hurt).  This follows the 
logic that Zaller (1992) lays out: when political elites disagree, as they 
consistently do in partisan elections, partisans follow their own party’s 
cues.  The divergence in the impact of an endorsement should grow 
with a voter’s adherence to her party affiliation.
Hypothesis 2. The impact of a Democratic Party 
endorsement should be strongest for a strong Democratic 
adherent, weaker for leaning Democrats and independents,
and non-existent or negative for Republican registrants.   
Third, we ask which types of candidates will benefit most from 
winning the Democratic Party’s endorsements.  Although Democratic 
lawmakers in California are generally liberal in their voting positions
(Masket 2007, Shor and McCarty 2011), there are internal divisions 
between traditional Democrats who are often associated with labor 
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interests and less liberal Democrats who are referred to as “business 
Democrats,” “BizDems,” or “The Mod Squad.”  We attempt to 
distinguish between these two types of candidates in our observational
study by recording whether a Democratic candidate listed a business 
profession on her official ballot occupational designation, and in our 
survey build this difference into our two candidate biographies.  We do 
so to test whether or not an endorsement means more for one group 
than the other.  Perhaps traditional Democrats benefit the most from 
an endorsement because it can fit into the voter’s existing “schema,” 
her frame of reference based on prior expectations about that 
candidate which makes her more readily acceptant of information that 
confirms this stereotype (Fiske 1986).  On the other hand, it could be 
that an endorsement only has an impact when it causes a voter to 
update her prior beliefs. If this is true, learning that a “Business 
Democrat” has won the party endorsement despite holding a less 
liberal position could be real news to the voter, and have a bigger 
impact on her behavior.  
Hypothesis 3a. The Democratic Party endorsement should 
have its largest effect on candidates with a traditional 
background.
Hypothesis 3b. The Democratic Party endorsement should 
have its largest effect on candidates with a business 
background.
IV. Evidence from a Survey Experiment
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Survey experiments allow researchers to randomly assign some 
respondents to a control group and others to one or more treatment 
groups, holding all else equal and thus isolating the causal impact of 
the treatment (Sniderman 1996).  Our treatment here is the party 
endorsement, which we can give to a particular candidate for a subset 
of our sample.   While work by Iyengar et al. (2001) applied this 
technique to test the effects of endorsements on proposition voting 
and Brader and Tucker (2009) and Brader, Tucker, and Duell (2012) 
probed the impact of party endorsements of policy positions, we have 
not seen any prior research conducting a survey experiment on the 
effect of party endorsements on candidate vote shares.  
We conducted our experiment by contracting with the polling 
firm YouGov, which administers online polls and uses weighting to 
ensure that the sample reflects general population characteristics.  Our
poll went into the field from May 29 through June 9th, 2012, just around
the time of the June 5th statewide primary, and included a sample of 
1,000 California registered voters.  All but 23 reported that they had 
voted or planned to vote in this election.  At the third question in a poll 
that went on to ask respondents a series of policy questions, we 
outlined a hypothetical state Assembly race with three candidates.  
The field included a “traditional Democrat” whom we named Greg 
Johnson, a “business Democrat” whom we named Sam Guthrie, and a 
Republican we named David Robertson.  We randomized the question 
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so that 1/3 of respondents were told that Johnson had won the 
Democratic Party’s endorsement in this race, 1/3 were told that 
Guthrie captured the endorsement, and the remaining 1/3 were not 
given any endorsement signal at all.  (The balance test reported in our 
Online Appendix, Table A1 confirms that the three treatment groups 
did not differ significantly in the characteristics of the respondents in 
each group.)  After presenting the biographies, we asked respondents 
for whom they would vote.  The set of options that we provided to 
respondents at the end of the question was designed to mimic the 
actual ballot format as closely as possible. The full text of the question,
along with a sample of an actual ballot from this election, can be seen 
in the Appendix, Figure A1. 
Table 1 shows how respondents distributed their votes among 
the candidates, for each of our three randomized conditions.  (All of the
vote shares reported in this paper incorporate survey weights.)  When 
neither Democrat was given the endorsement, Greg Johnson captured 
30.7% of the overall vote, while Sam Guthrie’s support was 18.3%. Yet 
when a different group of respondents was told that Greg Johnson was 
the Democratic Party’s endorsee, he did markedly better, winning 
39.3% of the vote.  This nine percentage point difference was 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, a clear sign that an
endorsement can help a Democrat with a traditional career 
background like Johnson’s.  For Guthrie, though, winning the 
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endorsement was less beneficial.  For the final 1/3 of voters who were 
told that Guthrie was the endorsee, his vote share increased by only 
three percentage points, to 21.0%, and the difference was not 
statistically significant.  
Table 1
The main results of this survey experiment provide partial 
support for Hypothesis 1.  Both candidates performed better when they
had won the endorsement, but the magnitude of the effect was much 
larger for the traditional Democrat than it was for the Democrat with a 
business background.  This provides support for Hypothesis 3a, 
suggesting that endorsements mean more for some types of 
candidates than others.  To be sure, a traditional vs. business 
orientation may not be the only important difference respondents 
perceive between our two hypothetical Democratic candidates. 
Johnson is associated with the environment, essentially a valence issue
among Democrats, while Guthrie’s stances are potentially more 
controversial. Additionally, Johnson’s experience on a school board 
(generally an elected position in the state) may be interpreted by 
respondents as an indicator of candidate quality that is lacking in his 
opponents.  These differences might interact with the endorsement 
treatment, driving the differential treatment effects that we attribute 
to Johnson’s traditional Democratic profile and to Guthrie’s business 
orientation. 
17
Table 2 and Figure 1 explore the contention of Hypothesis 2 that 
the impact of an endorsement will be stronger for voters who are more
strongly associated with the cue-giver, the Democratic Party.  Table 2 
reports the vote shares for each candidate in each condition, but only 
looks at voters registered with the Democratic Party.  It shows effects 
that are stronger.  Greg Johnson captured 60.3% of the Democratic 
vote when no endorsement was made, but 68.2% when he was the 
endorsee.  This endorsement effect was statistically significant.  Sam 
Guthrie won only 35.7% of Democratic support in the control group – 
evidence that he was not seen as the traditional candidate at the heart
of his party – and his support registered 37.6% support when he won 
the endorsement.  This more modest effect fell short of statistical 
significance, consistent with our finding among all respondents that 
the traditional Democrat, Johnson, was the only candidate who clearly 
benefitted from his party’s endorsement.
Table 2
Figure 1 divides Democrats more finely.  It draws on a 7-point 
measure of party affiliation, allowing us to separate weaker partisans 
from stronger ones. The data in the graph comes from a logit 
regression that predicts the impact of Greg Johnson winning the 
endorsement on the likelihood that a respondent will vote for him, 
holding constant a set of demographic controls4 in case they were not 
perfectly balanced by our randomization of the endorsement 
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treatment.  The two lines on the graph report the predicted likelihood 
of support when there is no endorsement and when Johnson is 
endorsed, with the gap between the lines signifying the endorsement 
effect.  The average estimated effect of this endorsement across all 
voters in the model was ten percentage points (an effect that is 
significant at the 95% confidence level).  It is clear, though, that this 
effect grows stronger the more closely a voter is affiliated with the 
Democratic Party.  There is almost no effect (three percentage points) 
for Republicans, while a real gap emerges for true independents in the 
middle of the scale (nine points) and grows further – indicating a 
stronger endorsement effect – as the graph moves to independents 
who lean Democratic, to weak Democrats, and finally to strong 
Democrats (for whom the endorsement effect is 15 percentage points).
This provides clear support for Hypothesis 2.
Figure 1
Overall, our results provide evidence that endorsements can 
exert a causal effect, but that this effect is conditional on the attributes
of both candidates and of voters.  An  endorsement benefits a 
traditional Democrat in our study, but the boost it gives to a Democrat 
with a business background falls short of significance.  For both types 
of candidates, the impact of the endorsement is stronger among voters
who are more closely allied with the Democratic Party. 
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V. Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design
Our second approach to the question of endorsement effects is 
to use “regression discontinuity” (RD) techniques to analyze election 
outcomes from the 2012 election in California.  The regression 
discontinuity (RD) design has seen a tremendous burst of popularity in 
recent years, long after its initial introduction by Thistlethwaite and 
Campbell (1960).  The essence of the design is fairly straightforward.  
Many decisions to implement a treatment are based entirely on the 
value of a continuous “forcing” variable.5  Cases falling above a 
predetermined threshold receive the treatment and those falling below
it do not, while the goal of the analysis is to evaluate the effect of the 
treatment on some outcome of interest.  
The challenge is that the forcing variable often reflects a key 
concept that has its own effects on the outcome variable.  In that case,
any difference between the treatment and control groups might simply
reflect the impact of that concept and not of the treatment per se.  The
RD design circumvents this problem by comparing only those cases 
falling just above and just below the threshold on the forcing variable. 
Those who score just above and just below the threshold are otherwise
quite similar: much of the observed effect of the award can be 
attributed to the treatment itself rather than to the impact of the 
forcing variable.  If the chosen bandwidth around the threshold is 
sufficiently narrow, then the act of crossing the threshold becomes 
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effectively random.  Any discontinuity in the relationship between the 
forcing and outcome variables at the threshold can therefore be 
attributed to the effect of the treatment alone (Lee and Lemieux 2009).
In our application, we compare the share of the vote won in the 
June 2012 primaries by candidates who, about six months before that 
election, just barely won or fell a few votes short of capturing the 
Democratic Party’s endorsements.  Candidates clustered around this 
threshold, we show, are – aside from some winning the endorsement 
and some not – quite similar, allowing us to isolate the impact of the 
endorsement.  We thus draw all of our causal inferences from these 
cases rather than from the fortunes of the hopeless candidates who 
failed to win any support in the internal party competition for an 
endorsement or from the incredibly strong candidates who won 100% 
of the internal party vote.  To estimate the causal effect of the 
endorsement, we use two approaches: the regression-based procedure
laid out by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009), and the randomization 
inference approach first developed by Fisher (1935) and applied to RD 
designs by Cattaneo et al. (2013).  Both approaches yield the same 
substantive findings.  
Critical to this analysis, then, is the internal party process used to
determine endorsements.  As noted earlier, the party used a multi-
stage process for deciding endorsements, first at “pre-endorsement 
conferences” around the state where local party activists could vote on
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the endorsement, and then at a statewide convention if no candidate 
received enough votes in the first stage.  The precise threshold for 
awarding an endorsement differed depending the stage of the process 
and whether the candidate was an incumbent, but formal rules 
governed this variation.  We use this continuous vote to examine the 
impact of endorsements on vote share in the June election using the 
RD framework.
RD’s key identifying assumption of randomness near the 
threshold is violated if certain individuals are able to manipulate the 
forcing variable to ensure a score just above the threshold.  For 
example, if skilled and experienced candidates were able to game the 
endorsement process to ensure a favorable outcome—perhaps by 
stacking the voting committee with supporters, for instance—then 
those barely receiving an endorsement would be better candidates 
than those falling just short, and the treatment might reflect nothing 
more than this process of self-selection.  Manipulation of this kind does
not create problems for RD so long as the candidates cannot precisely 
control the forcing variable (McCrary 2008, Lee and Lemieux 2009).  As
long as there is a sizable element of the process that is beyond a 
candidate’s control, outcomes near the threshold can be treated as 
effectively random and the identifying assumption is preserved.  
Fortunately, it is possible to test for random local assignment by 
examining whether cases above and below the threshold are similar in 
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their baseline covariates, and by testing for a higher density of cases 
just above the threshold.  Either might indicate the presence of 
manipulation and cast doubt on the causal estimate.  This is a problem
we take very seriously, since it is easy to imagine candidates 
attempting to manipulate the outcome and succeeding at it.  We will 
test our results for these sorts of limitations below.
To further probe our data, we employ a randomization inference 
approach to our RD analysis, as pioneered by Cattaneo et al. (2013). 
This approach treats the observations near the threshold as a local 
randomized experiment and is particularly optimal for small sample 
sizes. This method functionally serves as a robustness check on the 
traditional RD results, running 10,000 simulations of the test statistic 
(a difference of means, in this case) using the data near the threshold, 
and reports the range of results as a confidence interval. It focuses 
particular attention on the internal validity of the causal effect (Keele 
et al. 2012). We report the results of both the traditional RD and the 
randomization inference RD below.
As mentioned above, our forcing variable is each candidate’s 
share of the party’s vote to endorse in a given race.  We center this 
vote around the threshold for the endorsement in the final deciding 
vote, so the threshold always falls at zero.  Our outcome variable is the
Democratic candidate’s share of the vote cast for all Democratic 
candidates in each district.  The top-two primary raised the prospect 
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that voters would cross party lines in large numbers to support 
candidates on the other side of the aisle, but the incidence of such 
cross-party voting was probably small: the share of the primary vote in
each district that went to Democrats and Republicans was broadly 
predictable from elections when almost no crossover voting was 
allowed (McGhee and Krimm 2012), and at least one survey estimate 
suggested only 17 percent of voters voted outside their party 
identification (Ahler et al. 2013).  Thus, most voters were likely 
choosing among candidates of the same party and the relevant 
comparisons concern how much of the Democratic Party vote each 
Democratic candidate received.  We run our results with different 
outcome variables to be certain of our results.
The results of this basic RD design can be found in Figure 2 and 
in Table 3.  The bandwidth around which we estimate the regression 
discontinuity is determined by Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2009) 
mean squared error method and is relatively wide—plus or minus 12.3 
percentage points around the win/loss threshold.  In this simple first 
look, there is a clear discontinuity at the cut point.6  The discontinuity 
is 15.1 percentage points, very similar to the size of the effect we 
found in the survey data among Democratic voters.  This effect is 
consistent with our survey findings, moves in the direction that we 
hypothesize, and is significant at the 92% confidence level in a one-
tailed test (or 83% in a two-tailed test).  The estimated impact of an 
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endorsement is fairly sensitive to the size of the bandwidth – the 
discontinuity is 6.2 percent for a bandwidth half the size, and 10.6 
percent for a bandwidth twice the size – but is consistently positive and
large enough to have a substantive impact on election outcomes.1  For 
instance, former Democratic Assemblymember Lori Saldana fell just 
short of winning her party’s endorsement for the 52nd Congressional 
District, capturing 59.5% of the vote at the state convention rather 
than the 60% that she needed.  In the primary, she also fell agonizingly
close, finishing third with 22.1% of the vote while Democrat Scott 
Peters advanced to the general (where he unseated incumbent Brian 
Bilbray) with 22.6%.  An endorsement boost as large as any of those 
we estimate at different bandwidths would have made a clear impact 
in this and other tight races.  
Figure 2
Table 3
Is the apparent effect of an endorsement the product of selection
bias?  In particular, are strong candidates gaming the endorsement 
process to ensure their own success?  We address this question in two 
1 Unsurprisingly, given that there are relatively few candidates located 
just above and just below the cut point, the estimated impact of an 
endorsement is also sensitive to the exclusion of outlier cases.  When 
we excluded the candidates with the highest and lowest voter shares 
on both the left and the right sides of the cut point, and at the same 
time removed all candidates whose races were uncontested, the 
estimated endorsement effect did not surpass the 95% confidence 
level at any bandwith. The estimated effect did, however, remain 
positive at every bandwidth.     
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ways.  First, we look to see if there is a discontinuity in the density of 
the forcing variable itself (McCrary 2008, Caughey and Sekhon 2011).7 
If there are significantly more candidates falling just above the 
threshold than just below, it suggests that some candidates may be 
able to manipulate the process when the outcome is likely to be close. 
The results of this validation can be found in Figure A2 in the Online 
Appendix.  There is no clear discontinuity in the distribution at the 
threshold: the log difference in the height of the density at that point is
0.35, with a standard error almost three times as large (0.91).  As one 
would expect based on Figure 2, there is a high density of cases at a 
winning margin of 30 percent, which is the margin for almost every 
candidate who received 100 percent of the endorsement vote. 8  But 
the distribution looks almost uniform otherwise.
The second test involves examining baseline covariates within 
the same RD framework.  The logic is similar: if the outcome is 
manipulated, then candidates above and below the threshold should 
differ in terms of variables important for success in the primary.  If this 
is the case, then those variables could provide alternative explanations
(aside from the endorsement) of why endorsed candidates capture a 
greater vote share.  Even if there were no manipulation, with our small 
sample size it is especially important to determine whether any 
discontinuities are a product of chance alone.  Considered this way, it 
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is akin to validating that a randomization procedure was properly 
conducted in an experimental trial (Lee and Lemieux 2009).
We can identify two important covariates that predate the 
endorsement vote and might account for the differences.  The first is 
incumbency (Caughey and Sekhon 2011): are there more incumbents 
just above the threshold than just below it?  The answer is a qualified 
yes, though as with all of these analyses the sample size is small so 
the effects are difficult to estimate precisely.  Within the bandwidth 
estimated in Figure 2, one of six candidates was an incumbent below 
the threshold, compared to three of eleven above it.  Thus, it is 
possible that at least some of the effect we have found is due to 
incumbency alone.  That said, if we limit that analysis to non-
incumbents, as in Figure 3, the size of the discontinuity actually grows 
slightly to 19.6 points (p=0.18) and loses some of the apparent shift in 
slope that characterized the results with incumbents included.  
Figure 3
Another significant pre-treatment covariate is the amount of 
money a candidate has raised prior to the endorsement vote.  Strong 
fundraising can signal to those voting on the endorsement that a 
candidate has broad support among activists and interest groups and 
will be able to raise the resources necessary for a credible campaign.  
It can also serve as a proxy for the sort of general skill set required to 
be an effective candidate.  The key is to measure this money before 
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the vote so it is not contaminated with the effect of the endorsement 
itself.
Figure 4 shows this discontinuity estimate.  We have deviated 
the fundraising totals from the mean for each chamber (state 
Assembly, state Senate, and U.S. House) to reflect the different 
amounts typically raised for each type of race.  The result suggests 
that, if anything, those candidates above the threshold raised slightly 
less money than those below it, though the difference is small.  This 
result stands in contrast to the result with votes, where the endorsed 
candidates perform somewhat better.  Interestingly, there is also no 
clear difference in the money raised after the endorsement vote (see 
the figure’s second panel).  The amount is perhaps slightly higher and 
the variance does seem to increase somewhat, but there is no clear 
and consistent effect.  This helps to clarify the causal path through 
which endorsements work.  We see no evidence here that 
endorsements coordinate donors on the most viable candidate or help 
a candidate raise more than she otherwise would.  Endorsement 
effects, then, likely work through signals to voters (the sort of impact 
measured in our survey experiment) or through campaign dynamics 
other than fundraising.  
Figure 4
An alternative way of estimating the effect of an endorsement, 
which is appropriate for studies like ours with relatively small numbers 
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of observations, follows the Cattaneo et al. (2013) randomization 
inference RD method.  For this approach, we selected three different 
window sizes for the endorsement vote variable: 10, 15, and 20 points 
above or below the endorsement margin.  These windows are 
admittedly arbitrary, but they are close to that selected by the Imbens 
method (see above), and it is plausible to consider any vote among a 
small number of party leaders close if a candidate is within 20 
percentage points of the victory margin. 
The top line of Table 4 reports the results of this method for each
different window size.  The independent variable here is the margin of 
support received by the candidate in the endorsement convention, and
the dependent variable is the candidate’s share of the Democratic vote
in the June primary.  The outcomes reported are the estimated effect 
size, its p-value, the number of cases, and the confidence interval. For 
this analysis, only contested primaries are examined. This reduces our 
number of cases somewhat but also limits the analysis to those 
elections in which an endorsement could conceivably have affected the
vote share. Additionally, limiting the cases to contested races avoids 
situations in which the party has ceremonially backed an uncontested 
candidate or deterred other candidates from entering the race. This 
may reduce the size of the effects we are able to detect but also 
generates much more realistic and less biased estimates of the power 
of an endorsement.
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Table 4
As can be seen in the first line, the randomization inference 
approach yields an estimated effect of 7.8 percent of the vote for the 
±10-point window, with a p-value of 0.25. This is a relatively small 
estimate that falls well short of conventional measures of statistical 
significance – not terribly surprising given the small number of cases. 
The same method, however, calculates an effect of 11.7 percent of the 
vote for the ±15-point window, with a p-value of 0.07. This estimated 
effect size is very close to that calculated by our other approach to 
estimating the RD effect and in the survey experiment. The effect for 
the ±20-point window, meanwhile, is a slightly-larger 13.1 points, and 
that is statistically significant at the p≤.05 level. These findings 
provide additional confidence that the estimated effect is a real one 
and not simply due to chance. We can further test for selection bias 
within the randomization inference framework just as we did using the 
Imbens-Kalyanaraman approach. The lower rows in Table 4 show the 
results for district partisanship and pre- and post-endorsement 
fundraising. None remotely approaches statistical significance, giving 
us increased confidence that the effect we have calculated on primary 
results is real.
The core results presented here are robust to a number of 
alternative measurement and analysis decisions.  We coded all 
Democratic candidates according to their occupation as listed on the 
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ballot, and found, consistent with our survey results, that the effect of 
an endorsement appeared to be stronger for traditional Democrats 
than for those listing a business occupation on the ballot (see Table 3). 
While this is in some ways counterintuitive – one might have guessed 
that the endorsement would matter more if it gave voters new 
information about “business Democrats” who do not fit the traditional 
party mold – it is robust across our two types of data.  It provides 
support for the idea we set forth in our theory section that voters may 
be most receptive to endorsements when these signals confirm the 
schemas and expectations that voters already hold.  
In another robustness check, we find (using the Imbens-
Kalyanaraman approach) that the results are very similar when limited 
only to uncompetitive seats.  We also excluded candidates who were 
left uncontested when their opposition at the endorsement stage 
ended up dropping out by the election stage.  The discontinuity was 
smaller without these cases (12.7%, p=0.25), suggesting that at least 
part of the endorsement’s power is to scare off opponents.  
Nonetheless, the effect was still positive.
The one robustness test that had the greatest impact on our 
results was the removal of outliers from the traditional regression 
discontinuity method.  We removed cases with the highest and lowest 
vote shares in the Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth from both the 
treatment and control groups.  The estimated effects were notably 
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smaller, though still positive:  between one and 11 percentage points, 
depending on the precise bandwidth.  This should make us somewhat 
more cautious about the size of the endorsement effect, though 
considering the broader collection of evidence supporting such an 
effect, it is likely still real.  
VI. Conclusion
As much prior research has shown, endorsements at first glance 
appear to confer a major electoral benefit upon candidates.  In 
California’s 2012 primary, candidates who won the Democratic Party’s 
endorsement captured an average of 86% of the party’s vote, 
compared with an average of 32% for candidates who did not win the 
endorsement.  Even in a regression that controls for incumbency status
and a district’s party registration, the estimated effect of an 
endorsement is 40 percentage points.  But this apparent effect alone is
not enough to tell us whether parties act as kingmakers or mere 
cheerleaders in primary battles.  The candidates who win endorsement
battles at party conferences and conventions at the beginning of a 
campaign may be those who were already destined to perform well on 
Election Day.  Researchers need to approach the question of causal 
inference carefully to determine whether parties simply endorse only 
the strongest candidates or whether their endorsement adds to the 
electoral strength of those who earn it.
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This paper takes two approaches to this thorny empirical 
question.  Through a survey experiment and a regression discontinuity 
design, we find qualified evidence that an endorsement does indeed 
exert a causal impact on candidate vote shares.  The effect is not 
nearly as strong as one sees at first glance, averaging an estimated 10
to 15 percentage points.  Just as important, the effect appears to be 
contingent upon the type of candidate as well as the type of voter.  
The impact is strongest among voters who closely associate with the 
Democratic Party, in keeping with past findings about how individuals 
follow party elites (Zaller 1992).  In our survey experiment, a 
randomized endorsement had a statistically significant impact on the 
vote share of a traditional Democrat, but though it helped a Democrat 
with a business background, its impact was smaller and fell short of 
significance.  In our regression-discontinuity, the estimated 
endorsement effect had a similar magnitude and approached or 
surpassed significance at the 95% confidence level depending on the 
estimation technique used.  This effect was not strongly robust, falling 
below the standard level of significance when outlying cases and 
candidates in uncontested races were excluded.  The overall weight of 
the evidence points to a meaningful endorsement effect, but one that 
is more modest than what appears using other methods and one that 
is contingent in predictable, theoretically informative ways. 
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What do our results suggest for broader questions about the 
nature of party power?  Given that the evidence that we present here 
comes from just one state, just one election, and just one party, we 
should be cautious about generalizing to other contests and venues.  
Our approach here, rather, is to sacrifice some measure of external 
validity in our attempt to maximize internal validity through close 
attention to research design.  Yet there is little reason to believe that 
this case is particularly idiosyncratic in the impact of endorsements on 
voters.  As we have argued, the top-two primary gave parties a strong 
incentive to make endorsements, but did not significantly alter the 
voting experience of lay voters. They could seek out endorsement 
information if they wanted, as in any previous election, but otherwise it
was a relatively typical election for them.9  If anything, our use of the 
California case biases our results against finding an impact of party 
endorsements, since the parties had even less control over the choices
offered to voters than usual.  Further research will be necessary to see 
if the effect that we estimate holds across all legislatures over time, 
but we lay out an approach that can help guide wider exploration.  
What is truly unique about this election is the data we have 
obtained: internal party records of endorsement decisions and a survey
experiment, both for measuring the same phenomena.  Using these 
sources, we see that endorsements matter, but that when their impact 
is scrutinized carefully it becomes clear that they are not 
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determinative in all races.  The 40-50 percentage point performance 
gap between candidates who win and who lose endorsements is mostly
a function of their underlying strength, while our experiment and RD 
design suggest that 10-15 points of this gap may come from the true 
independent effect of winning the endorsement itself.  Parties do act as
cheerleaders for their strongest candidates, while ignoring those who 
seem destined to lose.  Yet when party elites wade into a closely 
contested endorsement fight in a district, it matters whom they chose 
in that internal battle.  Putting the party’s mark of imprimatur on one 
of two otherwise strong candidates, our survey and observation 
evidence shows, can make a notable difference.  In this constrained 
way, parties can use their endorsements to be kingmakers.  
35
Table 1. Survey Experiment Results for All Respondents
Johnson
Endorsed
(299
respondents)
Neither
Endorsed
(353
respondents)
Guthrie
Endorsed
(348
respondents)
Johnson Support 39.3% 30.7% 33.8%
Guthrie Support 17.8% 18.3% 21.0%
Robertson 
Support
42.9% 51.0% 45.2%
Notes:  N=1000 respondents.  The endorsement of Johnson, compared 
with no endorsement, brought statistically significant (p<0.05 in a one-
tailed test) changes in the percentage of voters supporting Johnson 
and in the percentage supporting Robertson.  The endorsement of 
Guthrie, compared with no endorsement, did not bring significant 
changes in support for any candidate.  
Table 2. Survey Experiment Results, Democratic Respondents
Only
Johnson
Endorsed
(131
respondents)
Neither
Endorsed
(159
respondents)
Guthrie
Endorsed
(159
respondents)
Johnson Support 68.2% 60.3% 57.7%
Guthrie Support 30.7% 35.7% 37.6%
Robertson 
Support
1.1% 4.0% 4.7%
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Notes: N= 449 Democratic respondents.  The endorsement of Johnson, 
compared with no endorsement, brought statistically significant 
(p<0.05 in a one-tailed test) changes in the percentage of voters 
supporting Johnson and in the percentage supporting Guthrie.  The 
endorsement of Guthrie, compared with no endorsement, did not bring
significant changes in support for any candidate.  
Table 3. Traditional Regression Discontinuity Results
Estimated
Treatment
effect p-value
Confidence
interval
All Democrats 15.12 0.07 [-6.61, 36.84]
Traditional
Democrats 11.18 0.32 [-10.97, 33.33]
Business
Democrats 0.77 0.99 [-112.47, 114.00]
Notes: Estimated treatment effects are the impact of the endorsement 
on the share of the primary vote for Democratic candidates, using the 
method outlined in Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2009). “Business 
Democrats” are candidates who listed a business occupation on the 
ballot, and “Traditional Democrats” listed other occupations.
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Table 4: Randomization Inference Regression Discontinuity Results
Window of ±10 Window of ±15 Window of ±20
Depende
nt 
variable
Treatm
ent
effect
p-value
(n)
Confide
nce
interval
Treatm
ent
effect
p-
value
(n)
Confide
nce
interval
Treatm
ent
effect
p-
value
(n)
Confide
nce
interval
Share of 
Democrati
c primary 
vote
7.78 0.25(14)
[-6.10,
22.14] 11.72 
0.07
(19)
[-1.25,
24.78] 13.12
0.03
(25)
[0.74,
25.63]
Democrati
c 
registratio
n in district
0.01 0.79(15)
[-0.09,
0.13] 0.02
0.63
(21)
[-0.06,
0.12] 0.02
0.66
(30)
[-0.05,
0.1]
Percent of 
Democrati
c spending
pre-
endorseme
nt
0.16 0.38(10)
[-0.28,
0.55] 0.16
0.31
(14)
[-0.17,
0.48] 0.11
0.43
(20)
[-0.16,
0.38]
Percent of 
total 
spending 
pre-
endorseme
nt
-0.01 0.98(10)
[-0.52,
0.47] 0.05
0.81
(14)
[-0.36,
0.46] -0.03
0.87
(20)
[-0.33,
0.28]
Note: For the above cases, uncontested primaries are omitted. The results for the share of the Democratic 
primary vote when all cases are included are 12.73 (p = 0.16) for the ±10 window, 17.59 (p = 0.04) for the
±15 window, and 23.49 (p = 0.01) for the ±20 window.
Figure 1. The Interaction of Endorsement with Party
Identification
Figure 2. Regression Discontinuity: Effect of Endorsement on
Vote Share
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Figure 3. Regression Discontinuity: Effect of Endorsement on 
Non-Incumbents
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Figure 4. Fundraising Totals for Candidates Just About and
Below Threshold
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